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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Layne Curtis Martin appeals from the district court’s orders denying his motion to
suppress and motion for reconsideration.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
While patrolling, law enforcement officers observed Martin peering into vehicle windows
in the Red Lion Hotel parking lot. (R., pp.16-17.) Martin entered an SUV, drove it to the front
of the hotel, then returned and parked the vehicle near where it had originally been parked. (R.,
p.17.) After Martin exited the SUV and entered the hotel, an officer looked through the windows
of the vehicle and observed items in the back seat that he identified as drug paraphernalia. (R.,
p.17.) Officers searched the SUV and found paraphernalia, a firearm, and financial transaction
cards in someone else’s name. (R., p.17.) Martin admitted he was a convicted felon; thereafter,
officers arrested him. (R., p.17.) A woman who had exited the hotel with Martin gave officers
consent to search her satchel. (R., p.62.) Officers located methamphetamine and heroin. (R.,
p.62.) Officers secured a search warrant for the hotel room in which Martin and the woman had
been staying. (R., p.62.) Inside, officers located two semi-automatic Glock pistols, over one
thousand dollars in suspected counterfeit cash, digital scales, small plastic baggies, a bag
containing twenty-two pills of amphetamine, another bag containing ten tablets of fentanyl, and a
bag containing over seventy-three grams of methamphetamine. (R., pp.62-63; State’s Ex. 2.)
The state charged Martin with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver,
forgery, two counts of possession of a controlled substance, and three counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm, along with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.271-75.) Martin
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filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained following the officers’ search of the vehicle,
arguing that the alleged paraphernalia in the SUV was not immediately apparent to the officer as
evidence of a crime and therefore the officer lacked probable cause to search the vehicle under
the plain view and automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. (R., pp.158-67.) The state
opposed Martin’s motion, arguing that the incriminating nature of the paraphernalia in plain view
in Martin’s SUV was immediately apparent and that the subsequent search of the vehicle was
valid under the automobile exception. (R., pp.198-206.)
The district court held a hearing on the motion at which the preliminary hearing
transcript, a picture of the alleged paraphernalia, and an officer’s body camera video were
admitted; no further testimony was given. 1

(See generally 5/14/2020 Tr., pp.7-17. 2)

The

preliminary hearing transcript and body camera video set forth the following, as is relevant to
Martin’s motion.
Officer Michael Macuk testified that he was on patrol on October 13, 2019. (Tr., p.8,
Ls.17-19.) At around 11:30 p.m., he was in the Red Lion parking lot with Officer Moyle. (Tr.,
p.8, L.20 – p.9, L.1.) The officers noticed a man walking around an SUV, talking on his cell
phone, and looking in the SUV’s windows. (Tr., p.9, Ls.12-15.) The man appeared to be
watching other individuals who were taking items out of the bed of a pickup truck in the same
parking lot. (Tr., p.9, Ls.17-23.) After the individuals left the truck and entered the hotel, the

1

Both Martin and the state attached to their briefing a picture of the alleged paraphernalia, which
had been admitted as State’s Exhibit 6 at the preliminary hearing. (See R., pp.171, 207.) Martin
also attached to his motion as Exhibit C a screenshot of an item available for purchase online.
(See R., pp.172-74.) However, the state objected to Exhibit C and the district court did not
consider it. (See Tr., p.12, L.22 – p.13, L.3.)
2
Citations to “Tr.” will refer to the preliminary hearing transcript, set forth in the “Exhibit to
Clerk’s Record” electronic document. All other transcripts appear in the continuously paginated
“Transcript” electronic document and will be cited to by date.
2

man opened the back hatch of the SUV, closed it, got into the SUV, and drove towards the front
entrance of the hotel. (Tr., p.9, L.25 – p.10, L.8.) Officer Macuk followed the SUV in his patrol
vehicle. (Tr., p.10, L.13.) The man stopped “just shy of the entrance” to the hotel and then
continued forward. (Tr., p.10, Ls.10-12.) He stopped again before turning around and parking in
close proximity to where the SUV had originally been parked. (Tr., p.10, Ls.14-17.)
Officer Macuk testified that the man’s behavior seemed suspicious. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-2.)
There had been “several vehicle prowler calls and vehicle thefts, or burglaries, recently.” (Tr.,
p.11, Ls.2-3.) Officer Macuk found it suspicious that the man was looking inside the SUV
through its windows, watching other individuals in the parking lot, and that the man didn’t get
into the SUV “until the parking lot was clear of any other people.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-10.) Officer
Macuk suspected that “there may have been a vehicle tampering, or a potential vehicle theft
happening.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.12-14.)
After the man parked, Officer Macuk exited his vehicle to approach the SUV; around that
same time, the man exited the SUV and began walking towards the hotel’s southeast entrance.
(Tr., p.11, L.25 – p.12, L.3.) Officer Macuk made contact with the man, who identified himself
as Martin and said he rented the SUV. (Tr., p.12, Ls.5-7.) Officer Macuk testified that he had
“no reason to continue” his contact and Martin was “free to go.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.17-20.) Martin
continued into the hotel. (Tr., p.12, Ls.17-18.)
Officer Macuk walked back to the SUV, where Officer Moyle was standing. (Tr., p.12,
Ls.22-23.) Officer Moyle advised Officer Macuk that “he could see drug paraphernalia sitting in
the floorboard of the rear – rear seat.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.24-25.) Officer Macuk looked through the
SUV’s windows and “could clearly see a silicone circle container, which is commonly used to
hold dabs, and miscellaneous glass piping” “in a cut out styrofoam piece…which appeared to be
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consistent with marijuana paraphernalia.” (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-5; p.21, Ls.8-13; -see State’s Ex. 6.)
The items were “on the floorboard of the back seat directly behind the center console.” (Tr.,
p.21, Ls.15-16.)
At that time, Martin and a woman exited the hotel. (Tr., p.13, Ls.7-10; p.14, Ls.7-10.)
Officer Macuk testified Martin had been walking towards the SUV but when he saw the officers,
“he immediately stopped and began walking the opposite direction towards the front entrance to
the hotel.” (Tr., p.13, Ls.12-16.) The officers made contact with Martin, told him to stop, and
confronted him about the paraphernalia in the SUV. (Tr., p.13, L.18 – p.14, L.2.) Martin got the
SUV’s keys from the woman and walked with Officer Moyle to the vehicle; Officer Macuk
stayed with the woman. (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-6.) Officer Macuk testified that Officer Moyle detained
Martin and began searching the SUV. (Tr., p.14, Ls.18-23.) Officer Macuk assisted by searching
the glove box. (Tr., p.14, L.24 – p.15, L.3.)
The woman provided Officer Macuk with information about a hotel room. (Tr., p.15,
Ls.4-10.) Officer Macuk and the woman entered the hotel, where the front desk clerk provided
them with a room key. (Tr., p.15, Ls.17-19.) She, Officer Macuk, and Sergeant Ward briefly
entered the hotel room, then exited the room; the officers secured the room while they applied for
a search warrant. (Tr., p.15, L.19 – p.16, L.5.)
On cross-examination, Officer Macuk testified in further detail regarding the items he
observed in the back seat of the SUV.

He testified that the items appeared to be drug

paraphernalia. (Tr., p.23, Ls.3-4; p.25, Ls.4-6.) In his experience, “the silicone circular container
is commonly used for marijuana dabs, as well as the glass – glass pieces being commonly used to
ingest – inhale marijuana.” (Tr., p.25, Ls.8-11.) Officer Macuk testified that he has “only seen
dabs” in round containers like the one in Martin’s SUV. (Tr., p.26, Ls.3-6.) Officer Macuk
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believed the glass piping was paraphernalia and appeared to belong to a type of bong. (Tr., p.26,
Ls.16-22.) When asked specifically how the items are used, Officer Macuk responded: “I don’t
ingest marijuana. I don’t know how they use them. I just know, from experience, those are
commonly accompanied with bongs.” (Tr., p.26, L.23 – p.27, L.1.) Although Officer Macuk
testified he had not seen the specific items found in Martin’s SUV used as a bong, he testified
that they appeared to be paraphernalia and he has seen similar items “accompanied with
marijuana devices, which are accompanied with marijuana, marijuana residue.” (Tr., p.27, L.5 –
p.28, L.6.)
Officer Macuk testified that he had not reviewed his body camera video prior to the
hearing. (Tr., p.36, L.20 – p.37, L.1.) When shown Exhibit 6, Officer Macuk testified that the
paraphernalia did not appear to be used in the photograph; however, he could not recall if the
items appeared used at the time. (Tr., p.25, L.12 – p.26, L.2; State’s Ex. 6.) He did not recall
looking at the paraphernalia, seeing it placed on top of the SUV, or any discussion with Officer
Moyle about the items. (Tr., p.38, L.10 – p.39, L.9.)
Officer John Moyle testified that he had been on patrol and in the Red Lion parking lot
with Officer Macuk. (Tr., p.41, Ls.7-18.) Officer Moyle observed Martin “walking about,
pacing back and forth, looking inside other vehicles, eventually opening the back hatch on one
vehicle, getting inside, and then beginning to drive.” (Tr., p.42, Ls.5-9.) Officer Moyle testified
he was suspicious because Martin’s behavior was “not normal” and there had been many vehicle
burglaries and thefts in that area. (Tr., p.42, Ls.11-17.) After Martin drove off, returned to the
same area, and parked again, Officer Moyle and Macuk exited their vehicles. (Tr., p.42, L.24 –
p.43, L.6.) While Officer Macuk contacted Martin, Officer Moyle approached the SUV, called in
its license plate to dispatch, and looked in the windows. (Tr., p.43, Ls.9-12.)
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Officer Moyle saw “a small green silicone container, or plastic, as well as some glass
piping.” (Tr., p.43, Ls.23-24; State’s Ex. 6.) The items were located “in the second row” of the
SUV “on the floor.” (Tr., p.44, Ls.17-18.) Officer Moyle testified that the items were “what [he]
believed to be a dabs kit.” (Tr., p.43, Ls.14-15.) He testified that a dabs kit is “a method to
smoke marijuana products.” (Tr., p.43, Ls.17-18.) Officer Moyle testified that there are items he
commonly sees with a dabs kit, such as a “main body…usually made out of glass or silicone or
some material like that.” (Tr., p.43, Ls.19-23; p.44, Ls.8-11.)
Officer Moyle informed Officer Macuk about what he saw. (Tr., p.45, L.3.) Shortly
thereafter, Martin exited the hotel with a woman. (Tr., p.45, Ls.3-5.) Officer Moyle testified that
he and Officer Macuk made contact with Martin again “[b]ecause there was paraphernalia inside
the vehicle in plain view.”

(Tr., p.45, Ls.3-11.)

Officer Moyle asked Martin about the

paraphernalia; at first, Martin “denied it was in there” but then “told [Officer Moyle] it was in
there and that he would get it for [Officer Moyle].” (Tr., p.45, Ls.12-19.) Officer Moyle
escorted Martin to the SUV, at which point Martin “started to get irritated and frustrated” and
said he wouldn’t retrieve the items. (Tr., p.45, Ls.23-25.) Officer Moyle then detained Martin.
(Tr., p.45, L.25 – p.46, L.2.)
Officer Moyle opened the SUV, retrieved the paraphernalia items, and continued to
search the vehicle. (Tr., p.46, Ls.12-14.) In the driver’s side door of the vehicle, Officer Moyle
located “a concealed black pistol.” (Tr., p.47, Ls.21-22; State’s Exs. 4-5.) Martin first denied
knowing who the gun belonged to, then stated it was a friend’s gun, and then said he bought the
gun for seventy-five dollars from a man named Billy Bob. (Tr., p.50, L.23 – p.51, L.1.) When
asked, Martin admitted he was a felon. (Tr., p.51, Ls.2-6.) Thereafter, Officer Moyle arrested
Martin. (Tr., p.51, Ls.10-15.)
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Officer Moyle then testified in more detail regarding the dabs kit. Officer Moyle testified
that “[a] dab is marijuana oil” that is consumed “[b]y smoking” using a bong kit or dabs kit. (Tr.,
p.68, Ls.3-11.) He testified that the dabs kit items were in Styrofoam, as depicted in State’s
Exhibit 6, and not covered by a box lid or cellophane. (Tr., p.75, Ls.7-21.) Officer Moyle
testified that the small circular silicone container was commonly associated with and used to
contain paraphernalia; the small metal piece was used to smoke marijuana products. (Tr., p.59,
Ls.1-19.)

Officer Moyle testified that he knew the dabs kit is “used to smoke marijuana

products.” (Tr., p.60, L.7.) Officer Moyle did not know the names of the specific items, but
knew them to belong to a dabs kit because he’d “seen them used,” although he’d never
personally witnessed someone use the items. (Tr., p.58, Ls.8-25.) Officer Moyle clarified that he
had seen people use dabs kits similar to the one he found in Martin’s SUV “in other cases” and
“TV shows, lots of things.” (Tr., p.64, Ls.16-24.) Specifically, he testified that he had seen dabs
kits in “[m]ore than four” other cases, several of which he was the primary officer, and he had
collected “[a] lot” of such kits. (Tr., p.66, Ls.9-23.)
Officer Moyle also testified that he had not reviewed the entirety of his body camera
video prior to the hearing. (Tr., p.63, Ls.5-7.) Officer Moyle did not know whether the dabs kit
in Martin’s SUV had been used. (Tr., p.60, L.7 – p.61, L.17.) He did not recall having a
discussion with Officer Macuk about the items. (Tr., p.63, Ls.8-22.)
Exhibit A—Officer Moyle’s body camera video—was also presented to the district court
in support of Martin’s motion. The video begins after Officer Moyle had seen the dabs kit in the
SUV and as he turned from the vehicle towards the hotel, where Martin and the woman just
exited. (Ex. A, 00:00-00:10.) Officer Moyle approached and made contact with Martin. (Ex. A,
00:10-00:30.) The following exchange occurred:
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Officer Moyle: “Alright, the dabs sitting in the back seat.”
Martin: “What dabs?”
Officer Moyle: “The dabs. The little circular container and the glass bowl sitting
in the back.”
Martin: “Oh that’s—that’s unused.”
Officer Moyle: “Then go open it and get it for me.
paraphernalia, right?”

You know that’s

(Ex. A, 00:30-00:45.) Martin got the keys to the SUV and walked to the vehicle with Officer
Moyle. (Ex. A, 00:45-01:20.) Officer Moyle told Martin that he had permission to search the
SUV due to the drug paraphernalia he observed inside. (Ex. A, ~1:22.) Officer Moyle then
detained Martin, noting again that he could see drug paraphernalia in the SUV. (Ex. A, 01:2501:55.) Shortly thereafter, Officer Moyle reiterated: “We could see the dabs kit sitting in the
back.” (Ex. A, ~03:39.)
Officer Moyle then began to search the vehicle. (Ex. A, ~04:10.) A while into the
search, Officers Moyle and Macuk had a brief exchange about items found in the SUV. Officer
Moyle held an item in his hand and asked, “What’s this?” (Ex. A, ~32:40.) Officer Macuk
responded, “I was looking at that. I’m not sure what that is.” (Ex. A, ~ 32:43.) Officer Moyle
replied that the item “[l]ooks like a torch.” (Ex. A, ~ 32:48.) The torch-like item, which can be
seen briefly in Officer Macuk’s hand, is not an item from the dabs kit. (Compare Ex. A, ~32:49,
with State’s Ex. 6.) Then, Officer Moyle said, “What’s all this stuff?” as Officer Macuk
retrieved the dabs kit from the top of the SUV. (Ex. A, ~33:00.) Officer Macuk picked up and
examined what appears to be a medical bracelet that was sitting in the dabs kit. (Ex. A, 33:0033:10; see also State’s Ex. 6.) Officer Moyle said: “Guy he said he took to the hospital,”
presumably referring to Martin’s earlier comment that he had taken a friend named Caleb Birch
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to the hospital that day. (Ex. A, ~33:09; 24:20.) Officer Moyle muttered something 3 and then
after a short pause said, “It’s enough for us”; Officer Macuk responded, “It’s enough for
paraphernalia.” (Ex. A, 33:20-33:25.)
After taking the matter under advisement, the district court denied Martin’s motion to
suppress. (R., pp.220-25.) In its recitation of the facts, the district court found:
Officer Moyle had looked through the windows of the SUV and observed a dabs
kit in the vehicle. Officer Moyle testified he “observed a small green silicone
container, or plastic, as well as some glass piping.” Officer Moyle advised Officer
Macuk that there was drug paraphernalia in the back seat of the SUV. Officer
Macuk looked in the rear seat of the vehicle and also observed the drug
paraphernalia. Both officers testified that they recognized the silicone container
as commonly used for marijuana dabs.
(R., p.221 (citations omitted).) The district court found the officers then made contact with
Martin “because there was paraphernalia inside the vehicle in plain view.” (R., p.222 (quoting
officer testimony).)
The district court then addressed whether the warrantless search of the vehicle was
justified by the plain view exception. (R., pp.223-24.) The district court first concluded that the
first prong of the plain view exception, which was unchallenged, was satisfied because “the
officer was properly in a position to observe the paraphernalia that was sitting out in the back
seat of the SUV.” (R., p.223.) The district court then turned to the second prong—whether it
was immediately apparent to the officer that the items were evidence of a crime. (R., pp.223-24.)

3

Officer Moyle’s statement is difficult to hear. (Ex. A, ~33:17.) Martin asserts that Officer
Moyle said, “It’s new,” in reference to the dabs kit. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.3, 22.) However,
the statement could also be “his name,” which would be consistent with the officers’ discussion
of the medical bracelet and may refer to Caleb Birch, whom Martin mentioned taking to the
hospital. (See Ex. A, ~24:20, 33:17.)
9

The district court identified key portions of Officer Moyle’s testimony, which demonstrated that
he observed the items in plain view in the vehicle, recognized them as a “dabs kit,” and knew
from his training and experience that dabs kits are used as a method to smoke marijuana
products. (R., pp.223-24.) The district court found that Officer Moyle “recognized the items
were drug paraphernalia as defined in I.C. §37-2734A(1)” and, therefore, “it was immediately
apparent that the items were evidence of the crime of possession of drug paraphernalia.” (R.,
p.224.)
The district court specifically rejected Martin’s assertion that the video contradicted
Officer Moyle’s testimony. (R., p.224.) “At approximately 33 minutes on the video, there is a
conversation between the officers regarding an item from the car, but the video does not establish
the conversation was about the dabs kit, nor does it show that Officer Moyle was unsure
regarding the item he called a dabs kit.” (R., p.224.) The district court concluded that “[t]he
evidence submitted indicates the incriminating nature of the items, as drug paraphernalia, was
readily apparent to Officer Moyle.” (R., p.224.) The district court denied Martin’s motion to
suppress. (R., pp.224.)
Martin moved the district court to reconsider its ruling.

(R., pp.227-37.)

Martin

specifically challenged the district court’s finding that the officers’ conversation on the video did
not demonstrate that Officer Moyle had not recognized the dabs kit as drug paraphernalia. (R.,
pp.227-28.) Martin argued the video showed Officer Moyle hold the dabs kit and ask what it
was.

(R., p.228.) Therefore, Martin asserted, the “statements made during the search are

inconsistent with Officer Moyle’s sworn testimony during the preliminary hearing and
specifically inconsistent with his testimony that he immediately recognized the items prior to the
search.” (R., p.228.) Martin identified specific portions of Officer Moyle’s testimony that he
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argued either contradicted the video or otherwise demonstrated Officer Moyle lacked credibility
and did not immediately recognize the dabs kit as drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.228-36.)
After a brief hearing and taking the matter under advisement, the district court denied
Martin’s motion for reconsideration. (See generally 6/25/2020 Tr., pp.18-22; R., pp.260-63.)
The district court re-reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript and body camera video. (R.,
p.260.)

The district court found it “clear that Officer Moyle [confronted] the Defendant

regarding his observation of drug paraphernalia in the Defendant’s vehicle.” (R., p.261.) The
district court again rejected Martin’s argument that the officers’ conversation in the video
demonstrate they did not recognize the dabs kit as paraphernalia. (R., p.261.) Although the
officers did not know the “specific names of the items in the kit,” see the items being used, or
“explain exactly how each of the items could be used for the ingestion of drugs,” “both officers
testified that they recognized the items as a ‘dabs kit’ which is drug paraphernalia based upon
their training and experience.” (R., p.261.)
The district court reiterated its conclusions that the video and testimony established both
elements of the plain view doctrine: “First, the officer was lawfully outside the car looking in the
window, where he observed the items he repeatedly called a dabs kit.

Second, it was

immediately apparent to Officer Moyle that what he observed was evidence of a violation of I.C.
§37-2734A(1).” (R., p.263.)
The district court rejected Martin’s argument that the officers’ testimony lacked
credibility. (R., p.263.) The district court agreed that “Officer Moyle could have prepared more
thoroughly prior to the testimony given in this case.” (R., p.263.) However, the district court
found that his “inability to give specific names to each item contained in” the dabs kit and “his
testimony that he did not personally observe the items being used, does not establish that Moyle
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was lying when he testified he recognized the items, as they were viewed together, as a dabs kit.”
(R., p.263.) Therefore, the district court concluded the state met its burden of establishing that
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement justified the search and seizure in this case. 4
(R., p.263.)
Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, Martin entered a conditional plea of guilty to
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance,
and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm; the state dismissed the remaining counts. (R.,
pp.276-82, 284-85, 296-98.) The district court sentenced Martin to eight years with three years
fixed for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; seven years with three years
fixed for possession of a controlled substance; and five years with three years fixed for unlawful
possession of a firearm; and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. (R., pp.290-93.) Martin
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.304-06, 310-14.)

4

Although the parties argued both the plain view and automobile exceptions, (see R., pp.158-67,
198-206), the district court did not expressly address the automobile exception in either of its
orders, (see R., pp.220-25, 260-63). The state agrees with Martin that “the parties had adequate
opportunity to present evidence and arguments on the automobile exception” and the district
court’s orders can be read “as including an implicit determination that the initial intrusion into
Mr. Martin’s vehicle was lawful.” (Appellant’s brief, p.14, n.3 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).)
12

ISSUE
Martin states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Martin’s requests to suppress the evidence
found as a result of the officers’ warrantless seizure of the items inside his vehicle and
warrantless search of his vehicle, because the plain view doctrine and the automobile exception
did not apply?
(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Martin failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?

13

ARGUMENT
Martin Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
Martin argues that the district court erred when it denied his requests to suppress evidence

because the search of his vehicle and subsequent seizure of evidence was unlawful. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.13-26.) Specifically, Martin argues that the plain view and automobile exceptions to the
warrant requirement do not apply because the officers did not immediately recognize the dabs kit
in the back seat of Martin’s vehicle as drug paraphernalia and therefore the officers lacked
probable cause to search the vehicle or seize the items. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-26.) Martin’s
argument is contrary to the evidence.
The evidence demonstrates that the officers immediately recognized the items in the back
seat of Martin’s vehicle as a “dabs kit,” which they knew from their training and experience to be
drug paraphernalia. The officers testified about the items they observed in the vehicle, that they
recognized the items as a dabs kit, that they knew such items to be used to ingest marijuana, that
they have seen similar items before and been involved in other cases where similar items had
been used or seized. Moreover, the video evidence corroborates that testimony. The video
shows Officer Moyle confront Martin about the items in the vehicle, during which Officer Moyle
specifically referred to the items as a “dabs kit” and drug paraphernalia.

The officers’

observation of drug paraphernalia in plain view inside Martin’s vehicle provided probable cause
to both search the vehicle under the automobile exception and seize the items under the plain
view exception.

Thus, the district court did not err when it denied Martin’s motions for

suppression and reconsideration.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“In an ordinary appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, our

standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 312, 429 P.3d 850, 853
(2018).

“This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly

erroneous” and “freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light of
the facts found.” Id. However, “where this Court has exactly the same evidence before it as was
considered by the district court,” this Court “do[es] not extend the usual deference to the district
court’s evaluation of the evidence.” Id. “‘Under these limited circumstances, this Court has
determined that its role on appeal is to freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence in the
same manner as the trial court would do.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 492,
399 P.3d 804, 819 (2007)).
C.

The Search Of The Vehicle And Seizure Of The Dabs Kit Was Valid Under The Plain
View And Automobile Exceptions To The Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches

and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures are presumed to be
unreasonable unless the search or seizure can be justified under one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146, 953 P.2d 583, 586 (1998).
However, an officer’s mere observation of something open to public view from a vantage point
that does not infringe upon a privacy interest normally does not implicate the Fourth Amendment
because “observation of items readily visible to the public is not a ‘search.’” State v. Clark, 124
Idaho 308, 312, 859 P.2d 344, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). Specifically, an officer’s observation of
items in plain view inside a vehicle in a parking lot accessible to the public is not a search and
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does not implicate Fourth Amendment constraints. 5 See State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 322,
824 P.2d 894, 897 (Ct. App. 1991). That being said, the warrantless search of such a vehicle or
seizure of items in plain view inside must be justified under an exception to the warrant
requirement.
The plain view exception to the warrant requirement permits the warrantless seizure of
items observed in plain view where certain conditions are met. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148,
155, 177 P.3d 362, 369 (2008). “First, the officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
otherwise properly be in a position from which she or he can view a particular area. Second, it
must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.” Id. “The second requirement is met when an
officer has probable cause to believe the item in question was associated with criminal activity.”
Id. at 155-56, 177 P.3d at 369-70; State v. Tamez, 116 Idaho 945, 946, 782 P.2d 353, 354 (Ct.
App. 1989) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983)). Relatedly, “[u]nder the longrecognized automobile exception, police officers having probable cause to believe that an
automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime may search the automobile without a
warrant.” State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d 210, 212 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Thla
Hum Lian, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 481 P.3d 759, 764 (Idaho Ct. App. 2020), review denied (Mar.
16, 2021).
Taken together, these exceptions permit officers to conduct a warrantless search of a
vehicle and seize items of contraband inside based on an officer’s observation of items in plain
view inside the vehicle that the officer has probable cause to believe constitute contraband or

5

Martin agrees that the officers’ observation of the dabs kit inside his vehicle did not constitute a
search or otherwise implicate the Fourth Amendment. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17.)
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evidence of criminal activity. State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 516-17, 415 P.3d 381, 384-85
(Ct. App. 2015); see also State v. Howard, 167 Idaho 588, 591, 473 P.3d 857, 860 (Ct. App.
2020).

It is self-evident that an officer has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains

contraband (thus justifying a search of the vehicle under the automobile exception) where the
officer can see contraband or evidence of a crime in plain view inside the vehicle. See Howard,
167 Idaho at 591, 473 P.3d at 860 (officers’ observation of marijuana in plain view in the center
console of a vehicle gave the officers authority to detain the defendant and conduct a search of
the vehicle).
“Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard, and a practical, nontechnical
probability that incriminating evidence is present is all that is required.” State v. Anderson, 154
Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012) (citing Brown, 460 U.S. at 742). Such probable cause
“is established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the
search would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable person—to a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. “Absolute certainty is not
required.”

Tamez, 116 Idaho at 946, 782 P.2d at 354.

“[A]n officer is entitled to draw

reasonable inferences from the available information in light of the knowledge that he has gained
from his previous experience and training.” State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 993, 783 P.2d 859,
860 (1989); Tamez, 116 Idaho at 946, 782 P.2d at 354 (an officer may draw reasonable
inferences based on his training and experience in determining whether an object observed in
plain view has a readily apparent connection to criminal activity).
An officer’s observation of items in plain view that the officer recognizes, based on
training and experience, as drug paraphernalia is sufficient to give rise to probable cause
supporting the warrantless search of the vehicle and seizure of the items. See Brown, 460 U.S. at
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742-43 (immediately apparent element of plain view exception satisfied where officer observed a
tied off green balloon in a vehicle and testified that, based on his experience, balloons tied in that
manner are frequently used to carry narcotics); State v. Chambliss, 116 Idaho 988, 991, 783 P.2d
327, 330 (Ct. App. 1989) (“The record indicates that [the officer], based upon extensive
experience in drug-related cases, was able to immediately recognize that the marijuana pipe
violated Idaho’s drug paraphernalia statute.”); Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 323, 824 P.2d at 898
(officer had probable cause to enter vehicle and seize spoon with residue that he observed in
plain view and recognized to be drug paraphernalia, from his training and experience); State v.
Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 121, 266 P.3d 1220, 1226 (Ct. App. 2011) (officer’s observation of
marijuana pipe in plain view, along with defendant’s comment that the pipe was “the only illegal
thing in the car,” provided the officer with probable cause to search the vehicle).
The evidence presented, including the officers’ testimony and the body camera video,
demonstrates that the officers immediately recognized the items observed in plain view in the
back seat of Martin’s vehicle and referred to as a “dabs kit” to be drug paraphernalia, and
therefore they had probable cause to seize the items and search the vehicle for additional
contraband.
Officer Moyle testified that he saw “a small green silicone container, or plastic, as well as
some glass piping” in an opened Styrofoam container, not covered by a lid or cellophane, inside
Martin’s vehicle. (Tr., p.43, Ls.23-24; p.75, Ls.7-21; State’s Ex. 6.) Officer Moyle identified the
items as “what [he] believed to be a dabs kit.” (Tr., p.43, Ls.14-15.) Officer Moyle testified that
“[a] dab is marijuana oil” that is consumed “[b]y smoking” using a bong kit or dabs kit. (Tr.,
p.68, Ls.3-11; p.43, Ls.17-18 (“A dabs kit is a…method to smoke marijuana products.”).)
Officer Moyle testified that there are items he commonly sees with a dabs kit, such as a “main
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body…usually made out of glass or silicone or some material like that” and “silicone containers
that hold the dabs of the marijuana product.” (Tr., p.43, Ls.19-23; p.44, Ls.8-11.) Officer Moyle
recognized the items as a dabs kit because he’d “seen them used,” although he had not personally
witnessed someone use these items. (Tr., p.58, Ls.8-25.) Officer Moyle testified that he has
encountered dabs kits and they appeared similar to the one found in Martin’s vehicle. (Tr., p.64,
Ls.19-24.) Specifically, Officer Moyle testified he has seen items like the dabs kit in Martin’s
vehicle in “[m]ore than four” other cases, “[m]ultiple” cases where he was the primary officer
who collected the kit, and that he’s “been doing this…for a couple of years, so [he’s] collected a
lot of them.” (Tr., p.66, L.9 – p.67, L.8.)
Officer Macuk testified that Officer Moyle stated he saw drug paraphernalia in the back
seat of Martin’s vehicle. (Tr., p.12, Ls.24-25.) Officer Macuk looked in the vehicle himself and
“could clearly see a silicone circle container…and miscellaneous glass piping” “in a cut out
styrofoam piece.” (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-5; p.21, Ls.8-13; State’s Ex. 6.) He testified that the silicone
container “is commonly used to hold dabs” and he has “only seen dabs” in such containers, the
glass pieces appeared to “belong to a type of bong” and are “commonly used to ingest -- inhale
marijuana,” and the items together appeared to be “marijuana paraphernalia.” (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-5;
p.21, Ls.8-13; p.25, Ls.8-11; p.26, Ls.3-6, 21-22.) Macuk testified that he had seen similar items
“accompanied with marijuana devices, which are accompanied with marijuana, marijuana
residue.” (Tr., p.27, L.5 - p.28, L.6.)
The body camera video corroborates the officers’ testimony and further demonstrates that
they immediately recognized the items to be drug paraphernalia. As soon as Officer Moyle made
contact with Martin and the audio began to record, Officer Moyle asked about the items he
observed in the back seat of Martin’s vehicle:
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Officer Moyle: “Alright, the dabs sitting in the back seat.”
Martin: “What dabs?”
Officer Moyle: “The dabs. The little circular container and the glass bowl sitting
in the back.”
Martin: “Oh that’s—that’s unused.”
Officer Moyle: “Then go open it and get it for me.
paraphernalia, right?”

You know that’s

(Ex. A, 00:30-00:45.) Martin then stated he was “from Washington,” to which Officer Moyle
responded, “I don’t care, you’re in Idaho.” (Ex. A, ~00:47.) Throughout his interaction with
Martin, before entering the vehicle, Officer Moyle repeatedly referred to the items as a dabs kit
and drug paraphernalia. (See Ex. A, ~01:22 (“[T]here’s drug paraphernalia in the car.”); ~01:34
(“I can see the paraphernalia in the car.”); ~03:39 (“[W]e could see the dabs kit sitting in the
back.”).)
The evidence demonstrates that Officers Moyle and Macuk recognized the items in the
back seat of Martin’s vehicle as a “dabs kit,” which they knew from their training and experience
to be drug paraphernalia. Just as an officer’s observation of items such as a tied off balloon,
pipe, or spoon with tarry residue, which the officer recognized as drug paraphernalia based on
training and experience, is sufficient to give rise to probable cause to search a vehicle and seize
the items of paraphernalia, see Brown, 460 U.S. at 742-43; Chambliss, 116 Idaho at 991, 783
P.2d at 330; Smith, 152 Idaho at 121, 266 P.3d at 1226; Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 323, 824 P.2d at
898, Officers Moyle and Macuk’s observation of items that they recognized, from their training
and experience, as a dabs kit and drug paraphernalia gave rise to probable cause supporting the
warrantless search of Martin’s vehicle and seizure of the items. Because the officers’ search and
seizure were supported by probable cause and fell under recognized exceptions to the general
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warrant requirement, the district court did not err when it denied Martin’s motion to suppress and
motion to reconsider.
There is no dispute regarding the applicable legal standards for the plain view and
automobile exceptions and Martin appears to agree that the search of his vehicle and seizure of
the items were lawful if the officers had probable cause to believe that the items observed in
plain view in his vehicle constituted contraband or evidence of a crime prior to their entry into
the vehicle. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18, 25.) Martin argues only that the officers did not
have the requisite probable cause based on his assertion that the officers did not immediately
recognize the items to be drug paraphernalia and their testimony to the contrary is not credible.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-26.)
Martin argues that the nature of the items as drug paraphernalia was not immediately
apparent to the officers, given that they were unable to testify in detail regarding the specific
names of items in the dabs kit or how such items are used. (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-24.)
However, the officers testified that they knew from their training and experience that the items
were used to smoke or inhale marijuana. Martin appears to argue that this is insufficient.
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has concluded otherwise.
In State v. Ramirez, an officer observed a lighter and a spoon with dark, tarry residue in
plain view inside a vehicle. Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 321, 824 P.2d at 896. The officer opened the
door of the vehicle and seized the spoon. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the
entry into the vehicle and seizure were supported by probable cause, based on the officer’s
inference that the items constituted drug paraphernalia based on his training and experience. Id.
at 323, 824 P.2d at 898. The Court of Appeals rejected Ramirez’s argument that the state failed
to sufficiently detail the experience upon which the officer’s inference was based. Id. The Court
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of Appeals concluded that the record was sufficient to establish that the officer had probable
cause to believe the items were drug paraphernalia, where the officer testified he had made a
previous arrest for heroin, knew what the substance looked like, and was aware of the practice of
using a spoon to melt heroin prior to injection. Id.
Officer Moyle testified that he recognized the items to be a dabs kit, he explained what a
“dab” is and how such kits are used to smoke marijuana, he testified that he had been involved in
and even the lead officer in prior cases where he had seen such dabs kits, and he had confiscated
numerous dabs kits in the past. (See Tr., p.43, Ls.14-23; p.66, Ls.9-23; p.68, Ls.3-11.) Just as in
Ramirez, that evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Officer Moyle had probable cause to
believe the items were drug paraphernalia.
Martin makes much of a brief conversation between the officers that occurred nearly
thirty minutes into the search of the vehicle and asserts “[t]he officers’ statements during the
search of the vehicle indicate they did not recognize what the observed items were before seizing
them, much less believe they were evidence of a crime.” (Appellant’s brief, p.18.) This
assertion fails for two reasons: first, it disregards the statements in the video preceding the search
of the vehicle and second, the conversation does not demonstrate that the officers did not
recognize the dabs kit as paraphernalia.
First, as discussed above, the video corroborates the officers’ testimony that they
recognized the items as drug paraphernalia prior to searching the vehicle. Both officers testified
regarding the items they observed and believed to be a “dabs kit.” The video shows that Officer
Moyle began his contact with Martin by confronting Martin about those items—“the dabs” and
“[t]he little circular container and the glass bowl” in Martin’s vehicle. (See Ex. A, 00:30-00:45.)
Officer Moyle continued to refer to the items as a dabs kit and drug paraphernalia throughout his
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interaction with Martin prior to searching the vehicle or seizing the items. (See
- - Ex. A, ~00:45,
01:22, 01:34, 03:39.) The video clearly demonstrated that Officer Moyle recognized the items as
drug paraphernalia before he even initiated his encounter with Martin, well before his later
conversation with Officer Macuk.
Second, contrary to Martin’s assertion, that later conversation does not call into question
whether the officers recognized the dabs kit as drug paraphernalia. The conversation that Martin
relies on begins with Officer Moyle holding an item in his hand and asking, “What’s this?” (Ex.
A, ~32:40.) Officer Macuk responds that he is “not sure” what the item is, and Officer Moyle
replies that the item “[l]ooks like a torch.” (Ex. A, 32:43-32:48.) The torch-like item they are
discussing can be seen briefly in Officer Macuk’s hand. (Ex. A, ~32:49.) That item is not an
item that was part of the dabs kit, as depicted in State’s Exhibit 6. Therefore, the officers’ brief
discussion about that item is irrelevant to whether they recognized the items in the dabs kit as
drug paraphernalia.
Officer Moyle then goes on to ask “[w]hat’s all this stuff?” as Officer Macuk retrieves the
dabs kit from the top of the vehicle. (Ex. A, ~33:00.) The video shows Officer Macuk pick up
and examine what appears to be a medical bracelet that was sitting in the dabs kit; he does not
appear to pick up or examine any other item from the dabs kit. (Ex. A, 33:00-33:10; see also
State’s Ex. 6.) Officer Moyle then states: “Guy he said he took to the hospital,” presumably
referring to Martin’s earlier comment that he had taken a friend named Caleb Birch to the
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hospital. (Ex. A, ~33:09; 24:20.) The officers do not discuss any other items in the kit. 6
Martin asserts that Officer Moyle was looking at the green and yellow silicone container
when he made these statements. (See Appellant’s brief, p.18 (citing Ex. A, 33:15-33:22).)
However, the video flatly contradicts that assertion. During the timestamp identified by Martin,
neither officer handles the green and yellow silicone container, nor can that item even be seen in
frame. The only item that was in the dabs kit that the video shows being specifically handled
during this time is the medical bracelet.
Martin then goes on to challenge specific portions of the officers’ testimony by pointing
out alleged inconsistencies between the testimony and the video. First, Martin points out that
Officer Moyle testified he did not know if the items were used, but on the video he appears to say
“It’s new.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.21-22.) This claim is dubious at best. As mentioned above,
the audio does not demonstrate that Officer Moyle made that comment. Nor does the video show
that Officer Moyle is specifically looking at any item in the dabs kit, aside from the medical
bracelet, when he allegedly made that statement; even if he did say “it’s new,” as Martin asserts,
it could have been in reference to the “torch” item he handled seconds earlier or the medical
bracelet he and Officer Macuk had just been discussing. Moreover, Officer Moyle did not
dispute whether the items were new or used, but states only that he did not know. (See Tr., p.60,
L.14 – p.61, L.11.)

6

As mentioned above, infra p.9 n.3, Martin asserts that Officer Moyle comments that the dabs
kit appears new. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3, 22.) However, Officer Moyle’s comment is not clear,
and can just as easily be understood as “his name,” which would make more sense in context,
given that the officers were examining a medical bracelet and Officer Moyle was relaying that
Martin had earlier stated he took a friend to the hospital. Even if the kit was new, such would not
show a lack of probable cause to believe it was paraphernalia.
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Next, Martin points out that Officer Moyle testified he did not recall having a
conversation with Officer Macuk about the dabs kit but the video shows that a brief conversation
occurred.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.22-23.)

However, Office Moyle did not testify that such

conversation never happened, only that he did not recall. (Tr., p.63, Ls.8-22.) Officer Moyle
testified that he had not reviewed his video prior to his testimony. (Tr., p.63, Ls.5-7.) As the
district court noted, it would have been preferable for Officer Moyle to have been more prepared,
(R., p.263), but the fact that he could not recall this brief conversation with Officer Macuk,
which by generous estimation took only thirty seconds, does not demonstrate that Officer Moyle
was not credible or was otherwise untruthful in his testimony.
For all the reasons explained above, the evidence demonstrates that the officers
immediately recognized the items in plain view in the backseat of Martin’s vehicle to be drug
paraphernalia and therefore they had probable cause to believe the items constituted, and the
vehicle contained, contraband or evidence of a crime. Accordingly, the warrantless search of the
vehicle and seizure of the items was permissible under the plain view and automobile exceptions.
Martin has failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress and
his motion for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2021.

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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